14. Corpora and where they come from¶
This chapter lists every corpus AgentPROV declares, with each part's format, pinned origin, licence, execution count,
status and caveats. The corpora themselves are not in the repository: they live under AGENTPROV_HOME, and
agentprov stats --corpus <corpus> counts a built one (chapter 6).
Where the data comes from¶
Every source was found by a systematic search with eligibility criteria fixed before screening
(docs/reports/systematic-search/).
It covered code platforms (GitHub, GitLab, Codeberg, Hugging Face), the literature, and research-data repositories
(Zenodo, Hugging Face, DataCite, Figshare and others).
- Licences. Data with no licence, or with a licence that forbids redistribution, is excluded. The location of such
data may be recorded with licence policy
reference, but nothing from it is released. (restricted) marks a licence with a use clause, such as AgentHarm's "AI safety only" clause. Each copyleft source (AGPL or GPL) has its own corpus, and non-commercial data never mixes with permissive data. - Outcomes. Data is never excluded for its outcome: a source, arm or part in which no attack succeeded is included like any other.
- Pins. Each part is pinned to exact bytes, and an import refuses anything else. A git pin names the repository, the commit, and usually the tree with its hash and expected file count. A Zenodo pin names the record (DOI), its version, and each file with its size and checksum. A Hugging Face pin names the dataset, the revision, and each file (or each part of a split archive) with its size and LFS sha256. A URL pin names the address and the file with its size and sha256.
The bytes go into the raw store unchanged, and each corpus carries the sha256 chain raw → AER → SEM → PROV
(agentprov verify --level chain).
How to read the listing¶
- Status is the registry's gated status (chapter 3).
- Corpus is the sealed corpus id for a sealed part, otherwise the registry's corpus id. Status names a sealed
corpus's version by its tag,
corpus/<corpus_id>/v<version>, an annotated tag on the commit that sealed it. - Executions is the count recorded in the repository, linked to the committed report it comes from, with the basis
of the count: sealed, the executions a sealed corpus releases (after withholding), from its seal report; a full
import through
agentprov import; a census of the pinned bytes; a trial import into a scratch corpus; records mapped in memory without an import; or the specification (spec). A corpus of several parts gives its released count on one part, and the others say so. - Caveats come from the source profiles and the registry: what is withheld, redacted or not yet read.
- The second table gives each source's project page and the paper that describes it, linked by its arXiv id or DOI
where the profile records one. A paper marked found by web search was matched to the source later, and
tools/readme_corpora.tomlrecords how.
The listing is generated by tools/gen_readme_corpora.py from the registry, the source profiles and the committed
reports; a test checks that it is current. It never reads a corpus. A branch that adds a source, part, pin or count
adds the part to tools/readme_corpora.toml and runs uv run python tools/gen_readme_corpora.py --write; a conflict
in the block is resolved by running it again, never by hand.
53 corpora are declared, built from 61 source parts. 52 are sealed (version 0.1.0) and hold 417,898 released executions; 1 is not yet imported in full. The systematic search lists 756 distinct sources: 47 included and 709 excluded, 155 of them only for their licence (no licence: 145; redistribution forbidden: 10). Counts from records-merged.jsonl.
| Corpus | Source · part | Format (dialect, variants) | Pinned origin | Licence | Executions | Status | Caveats |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
agentdojo-upstream-head |
agentdojo · head |
agentdojo.tracelogger (v0.k11, v1.k14, v1.k14.incomplete) |
GitHub ethz-spylab/agentdojo @ 089ed468 runs/ |
MIT | 36,666 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/agentdojo-upstream-head/v0.1.0 |
207 outcome-only logs |
agentdojo-upstream-2024-06 |
agentdojo · 2024-06 |
agentdojo.tracelogger (v0.k11) |
GitHub ethz-spylab/agentdojo @ c2748856 runs/ |
MIT | 18,231 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/agentdojo-upstream-2024-06/v0.1.0 |
207 outcome-only logs |
agentdyn-a |
agentdyn · a |
agentdojo.tracelogger (v1.k14, v1.k14.incomplete) |
GitHub SaFo-Lab/AgentDyn @ 5353cf76 runs/ |
MIT | 38,154 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/agentdyn-a/v0.1.0 |
— |
agentdyn-b |
agentdyn · b |
agentdojo.tracelogger (v0.k11) |
GitHub SaFo-Lab/AgentDyn @ 5353cf76 runs/ (the pin of part a) |
MIT | 5,167 (sealed) | import partial, sealed corpus/agentdyn-b/v0.1.0 |
— |
agentdyn-c |
agentdyn · c |
agentdojo.tracelogger (drift.k18.messages) |
GitHub SaFo-Lab/AgentDyn @ 5353cf76 runs/ (the pin of part a) |
MIT | 4,244 (sealed) | import partial, sealed corpus/agentdyn-c/v0.1.0 |
— |
agentdyn |
agentdyn · history |
agentdojo.tracelogger (drift.k18.messages, v1.k14.incomplete) |
GitHub SaFo-Lab/AgentDyn @ 785b9127 runs/gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18-drift/ |
MIT | 16,175 (spec) | import planned | opt-in part of 16,795 superseded git blobs; fingerprint deduplication deferred to v0.2; first slice pinned at 785b9127: the 621 logs (620 drift.k18.messages, one v1.k14.incomplete) of runs/gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18-drift/ (R-10j-2, regeneration-batch item 95), not fetched or imported in v0.1 |
rope |
autodojo · rope-slice |
agentdojo.tracelogger (v1.k14) |
GitHub xhOwenMa/ROPE @ 64495e16 |
MIT | 2,847 logs (full import) | import partial, sealed corpus/rope/v0.1.0 |
imported, owned and counted under rope · head |
rope |
rope · head |
agentdojo.tracelogger (v1.k14, v1.k14.incomplete) |
GitHub xhOwenMa/ROPE @ 64495e16 |
MIT | 10,774 (sealed) | import supported, live planned, sealed corpus/rope/v0.1.0 |
— |
adprov-v1-release |
adprov-v1 · release |
adprov.transcript_v1 (v1) |
GitHub nickjones39/agentdojo-prov @ 579a9083 corpus/corpus-prov |
CC-BY-4.0 | 17,656 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/adprov-v1-release/v0.1.0 |
— |
ast-survey-agentharm |
agent-security-tools-survey · agentharm |
inspect.eval (v2) |
GitHub Forever-CodingNoob/agent-security-tools-survey @ 89c4db2c agentharm/results (+2 more pins) |
CC-BY-4.0 | 1,055 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/ast-survey-agentharm/v0.1.0 |
restricted use: AgentHarm's clause, use only to improve AI safety and security; a release seal withholds [withhold] matches: raw log headers whose dataset location names a third-party account's home directory; withheld, digest kept |
ast-survey-agentdojo |
agent-security-tools-survey · agentdojo-runs |
agentdojo.tracelogger (v1.k14) |
GitHub Forever-CodingNoob/agent-security-tools-survey @ 89c4db2c agentdojo (+2 more pins) |
CC-BY-4.0 | 3,232 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/ast-survey-agentdojo/v0.1.0 |
a release seal withholds [withhold] matches: console logs whose traceback paths name a third-party account's home directory; withheld, digest kept |
mandate-agentdojo-eval |
mandate-agentdojo-eval · head |
agentdojo.tracelogger (v1.k14) |
GitHub jwilliamsc/mandate-agentdojo-eval @ fa62a977 |
MIT | 396 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/mandate-agentdojo-eval/v0.1.0 |
— |
dtap-bench |
dtap · head |
dtap.trajectory (v1) |
HF AI-Secure/DTap-Bench-Agent-Trajectories @ 836caf2f (+3 more pins) |
Apache-2.0 | 67,708 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/dtap-bench/v0.1.0 |
the census counts 67,808 trajectory files: 67,806 parseable, 20 synthetic (not executions); five harness-host account paths redacted over every AER string by a labels allowlist (D-607); raw ships as pinned (D-186) |
openagentsafety |
openagentsafety · head |
openhands.events (oas-0.28) |
GitHub sani903/OpenAgentSafety @ 857798ff |
MIT | 1,558 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/openagentsafety/v0.1.0 |
— |
redcode-exec-openhands |
redcode-exec-openhands · head |
openhands.events (oh-1.5) |
Zenodo 23168099 (6 files) (+1 more pin) | CC-BY-4.0 | 5,459 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/redcode-exec-openhands/v0.1.0 |
a release seal withholds [withhold] matches: a real-format access token in an unselected member of the deposit's supplementary archive; the archive is withheld, the value is never recorded |
interbolt-agentdojo |
interbolt-agentdojo · head |
agentdojo.tracelogger (v1.k14) |
GitHub deconvolute-labs/interbolt-agentdojo @ 43e2b5fa |
Apache-2.0 | 2,016 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/interbolt-agentdojo/v0.1.0 |
a release seal withholds [withhold] matches: a workstation account path of a third party (a named macOS home directory); withheld, digest kept |
melon-agentdojo |
melon-agentdojo · head |
agentdojo.tracelogger (v1.k14, v1.k14.incomplete) |
GitHub xwsdid/MELON @ 71d99dff |
MIT | 1,911 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/melon-agentdojo/v0.1.0 |
— |
glitch-agentdojo |
glitch-agentdojo · head |
agentdojo.tracelogger (v1.k14) |
GitHub zanethomas1430-code/Glitch @ 713bb296 |
MIT | 1,842 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/glitch-agentdojo/v0.1.0 |
— |
mohameduk-agentdojo |
mohameduk-agentdojo · head |
agentdojo.tracelogger (v1.k14) |
GitHub mohameduk/agentdojo @ 3f9d69a1 |
MIT | 3,628 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/mohameduk-agentdojo/v0.1.0 |
— |
tacit-agentdojo |
tacit-agentdojo · head |
agentdojo.tracelogger (v1.k14, v1.k14.incomplete) |
GitHub CSSLab/Tacit @ 995692d3 |
Apache-2.0 | 2,070 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/tacit-agentdojo/v0.1.0 |
— |
geryon-agentdojo |
geryon-agentdojo · head |
agentdojo.tracelogger (v0.k11) |
GitHub luiacuaniello/geryon @ 905aae02 |
Apache-2.0 | 3,179 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/geryon-agentdojo/v0.1.0 |
— |
hilarytorn-trajectory-poisoning |
hilarytorn-trajectory-poisoning · head |
agentdojo.tracelogger (v1.k14) |
GitHub HilaryTorn/in-context-trajectory-poisoning @ d71ab8bc |
MIT | 990 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/hilarytorn-trajectory-poisoning/v0.1.0 |
— |
yockcheng-prompt-injection-harness |
yockcheng-prompt-injection-harness · head |
agentdojo.tracelogger (v1.k14, v1.k14.incomplete) |
GitHub yockcheng/prompt-injection-harness @ 5f9137ff |
Apache-2.0 | 280 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/yockcheng-prompt-injection-harness/v0.1.0 |
— |
shreeyavarma-llm-safety |
shreeyavarma-llm-safety · head |
agentdojo.tracelogger (v1.k14, v1.k14.incomplete) |
GitHub ShreeyaVarma/llm_safety @ 78d22e4a |
MIT | 672 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/shreeyavarma-llm-safety/v0.1.0 |
— |
gate-agentdojo |
gate-agentdojo · head |
agentdojo.tracelogger (v1.k14, v1.k14.incomplete) |
GitHub dafarusd/gate @ 925b9926 |
AGPL-3.0-only | 3,870 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/gate-agentdojo/v0.1.0 |
copyleft: its own corpus (D-94) |
sentry-agentdojo |
sentry-agentdojo · head |
agentdojo.tracelogger (v1.k14, v1.k14.incomplete) |
GitHub vinhqdang/SENTRY-Anytime-Valid-E-Process-Monitoring-of-LLM-Agent-Action-Streams @ 938e8be7 |
AGPL-3.0-only | 674 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/sentry-agentdojo/v0.1.0 |
copyleft: its own corpus (D-94) |
bookkeeper-agentdojo |
bookkeeper-agentdojo · head |
agentdojo.tracelogger (v1.k14, v1.k14.incomplete) |
GitHub sricursion/bookkeeper @ 0fe09bb6 |
GPL-3.0-or-later | 570 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/bookkeeper-agentdojo/v0.1.0 |
copyleft: its own corpus (D-94) |
aiauthz-agentdojo |
aiauthz-agentdojo · head |
agentdojo.tracelogger (v1.k14) |
GitHub Sports-Vision-Inc/aiAuthZ @ 6eaac86a |
AGPL-3.0-only | 174 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/aiauthz-agentdojo/v0.1.0 |
copyleft: its own corpus (D-94) |
kongminos-agentdojo |
kongminos-agentdojo · head |
agentdojo.tracelogger (v1.k14) |
GitHub kongminOS/jspace-agentdojo-950 @ f341af69 |
MIT | 950 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/kongminos-agentdojo/v0.1.0 |
— |
ceferisbarov-agentdojo |
ceferisbarov-agentdojo · head |
agentdojo.tracelogger (v1.k14, v1.k14.incomplete) |
GitHub ceferisbarov/agentdojo @ 2273e1cd |
MIT | 18,438 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/ceferisbarov-agentdojo/v0.1.0 |
— |
memo-ozdincer-agentdojo |
memo-ozdincer-agentdojo · head |
agentdojo.results_container (rc.k7, rc.k12) |
GitHub memo-ozdincer/agentdojo @ 7c331d97 |
MIT | 13,064 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/memo-ozdincer-agentdojo/v0.1.0 |
one execution per row of 137 results containers; 1,038 exception rows outcome-only with imposed outcomes (D-475); account paths in model ids redacted in the AER (D-476) |
linyxus-agentdojo |
linyxus-agentdojo · head |
agentdojo.tracelogger (v1.k14, v1.k14.incomplete) |
GitHub Linyxus/agentdojo @ 698d7ff2 |
MIT | 9,068 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/linyxus-agentdojo/v0.1.0 |
— |
craibench-agentdojo |
craibench-agentdojo · head |
agentdojo.tracelogger (v0.k11) |
GitHub AthaSSiN/CrAIBench @ e41eac1e |
MIT | 1,163 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/craibench-agentdojo/v0.1.0 |
— |
menelaus29-ipi-multidomain |
menelaus29-ipi-multidomain · head |
agentdojo.tracelogger (v1.k14, v1.k14.incomplete) |
GitHub Menelaus29/ipi-multidomain-agent-study @ ec9c9287 |
MIT | 858 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/menelaus29-ipi-multidomain/v0.1.0 |
— |
llm-lock-agentdojo |
llm-lock-agentdojo · head |
agentdojo.tracelogger (v1.k14) |
GitHub Wakeful-Cloud/llm-lock @ 7bb9915b |
GPL-3.0 | 52,387 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/llm-lock-agentdojo/v0.1.0 |
copyleft: its own corpus (D-94) |
whistlebench |
whistlebench · final-runs |
inspect.eval (v2) |
GitHub legobridge/whistlebench @ 9c27637c final_runs |
MIT | 9,200 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/whistlebench/v0.1.0 |
a release seal withholds [withhold] matches: a credential-shaped value in a log header's repository URL; value never recorded |
seagent-agentdojo |
seagent-agentdojo · head |
agentdojo.tracelogger (v1.k14) |
Zenodo 23218779: seagent-acsac2026-ae-v2.zip |
CC-BY-4.0 | 5,331 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/seagent-agentdojo/v0.1.0 |
— |
kexin-xu-01-agentharm |
kexin-xu-01-agentharm · logs |
inspect.eval (v2) |
GitHub Kexin-xu-01/agentharm @ 859c34f4 logs |
MIT | 2,796 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/kexin-xu-01-agentharm/v0.1.0 |
restricted use: AgentHarm's clause, use only to improve AI safety and security; a release seal withholds [withhold] matches: raw log headers and journals whose dataset location names a third-party account's home directory; 18 logs name local checkpoints by account paths, redacted in the AER (D-182, regeneration-batch item 107); raw objects whose model ids carry account paths ship as pinned (D-186) |
fragfuse-agentharm |
fragfuse-agentharm · logs |
inspect.eval (v2) |
GitHub zixin22/fragfuse_agentharm @ 24cc8aea |
MIT | 1,747 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/fragfuse-agentharm/v0.1.0 |
restricted use: AgentHarm's clause, use only to improve AI safety and security; a release seal withholds [withhold] matches: raw log objects that name a third-party workstation account path; derived records carry ext (D-182, regeneration-batch item 107) |
agentops-bench |
agentops-bench · pilot-v1-seeded |
agentops.trace (v1) |
Zenodo 19875693: agentops-bench-v1.0-pilot-traces.tar.gz (+2 more pins) |
Apache-2.0 | 3,360 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/agentops-bench/v0.1.0 |
a release seal withholds [withhold] matches: a third-party workstation account path in tool output (D-608); the AER holds a salted label instead; the in-scope subset of 7,200 runs (D-143, D-191) |
drift-head |
drift · head |
agentdojo.tracelogger (drift.k18.conversations) |
GitHub SaFo-Lab/DRIFT @ 6fd3df47 runs/ |
MIT | 1,564 (sealed) | import partial, sealed corpus/drift-head/v0.1.0 |
— |
credleak-p15b |
credleak-p15b · head |
credleak.cell (v1) |
Zenodo 22737462 v3: p15b-run-data-v3-2026-09-13.zip |
CC-BY-4.0 | 14,207 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/credleak-p15b/v0.1.0 |
a release seal withholds [withhold] matches: planted canary credentials of the study (benchmark design); values never recorded; withholding per D-265 |
controlarena-persistent |
controlarena-persistent · zip-3-001 |
inspect.eval (v2) |
HF idacy/control-arena-persistent-state-eval-archive-2026-07-30 @ 84d39e0a: logs_tmp_zips/logs-20260610T154758Z-3-001.zip (8 parts) |
MIT | 0 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/controlarena-persistent/v0.1.0 |
a release seal withholds [withhold] matches: generated and planted credentials of the AI-control setting (benchmark design); values never recorded; a metadata-only release: all 5,742 executions of the corpus's five parts are withheld at the seal (D-344); account paths in harness text redacted (D-349, D-182); the raw objects holding them withheld (D-604) |
controlarena-persistent |
controlarena-persistent · zip-3-002 |
inspect.eval (v2) |
HF idacy/control-arena-persistent-state-eval-archive-2026-07-30 @ 84d39e0a: logs_tmp_zips/logs-20260610T154758Z-3-002.zip (8 parts) |
MIT | 153 samples (census) | import supported, sealed corpus/controlarena-persistent/v0.1.0 |
a release seal withholds [withhold] matches: generated and planted credentials of the AI-control setting (benchmark design); values never recorded; account paths in harness text redacted (D-349, D-182); the raw objects holding them withheld (D-604); released with the corpus (metadata only), counted under controlarena-persistent · zip-3-001 |
controlarena-persistent |
controlarena-persistent · zip-3-003 |
inspect.eval (v2) |
HF idacy/control-arena-persistent-state-eval-archive-2026-07-30 @ 84d39e0a: logs_tmp_zips/logs-20260610T154758Z-3-003.zip (3 parts) |
MIT | 810 samples (census) | import supported, sealed corpus/controlarena-persistent/v0.1.0 |
a release seal withholds [withhold] matches: generated and planted credentials of the AI-control setting (benchmark design); values never recorded; account paths in harness text redacted (D-349, D-182); the raw objects holding them withheld (D-604); released with the corpus (metadata only), counted under controlarena-persistent · zip-3-001 |
controlarena-persistent |
controlarena-persistent · batch-runs |
inspect.eval (v2) |
HF idacy/control-arena-persistent-state-eval-archive-2026-07-30 @ 84d39e0a: logs_batch_runs-20260730.tar.zst |
MIT | 638 samples (census) | import supported, sealed corpus/controlarena-persistent/v0.1.0 |
a release seal withholds [withhold] matches: generated and planted credentials of the AI-control setting (benchmark design); values never recorded; account paths in harness text redacted (D-349, D-182); the raw objects holding them withheld (D-604); released with the corpus (metadata only), counted under controlarena-persistent · zip-3-001 |
controlarena-persistent |
controlarena-persistent · auditor |
inspect.eval (v2) |
HF idacy/control-arena-persistent-state-eval-archive-2026-07-30 @ 84d39e0a: agentic_auditor_logs-20260730.tar.zst |
MIT | 6 samples (census) | import supported, sealed corpus/controlarena-persistent/v0.1.0 |
a release seal withholds [withhold] matches: generated and planted credentials of the AI-control setting (benchmark design); values never recorded; account paths in harness text redacted (D-349, D-182); the raw objects holding them withheld (D-604); released with the corpus (metadata only), counted under controlarena-persistent · zip-3-001 |
atia-benchmark |
atia-benchmark · logs |
inspect.eval (v2) |
GitHub mattngyn/atia_benchmark @ cc71caf5 logs |
MIT | 110 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/atia-benchmark/v0.1.0 |
— |
autogen-guard-placement |
autogen-guard-placement · v1.0 |
autogen.runs (condition, defense, injecagent, team) |
Zenodo 23025259 v1.0: autogen-guard-placement-data-code-v1.0.zip |
CC-BY-4.0 | 1,080 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/autogen-guard-placement/v0.1.0 |
a release seal withholds [withhold] matches: a real-format service secret key in a deposit member the profile does not select; value never recorded; withholding per D-603 |
what-surrounds |
what-surrounds · runs-named |
wirelog.request_response (bedrock-converse, anthropic-messages) |
Zenodo 21944598 1.0.0: prompt-injection-study.zip |
CC-BY-4.0 | 1,334 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/what-surrounds/v0.1.0 |
the tools are synthetic by design (D-284) |
mcphunt |
mcphunt · head |
mcphunt.traces (v2.0.0) |
HF lihaonan0716/mcphunt-agent-traces @ c4c69322 (+15 more pins) |
CC-BY-4.0 | 2,190 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/mcphunt/v0.1.0 |
a release seal withholds [withhold] matches: planted canary credential (MCPHunt benchmark design); the value is never recorded in a public release; withholding per D-289 |
code-agent-misalignment |
code-agent-misalignment-geminicli · results-raw |
geminicli.stream_json (v1) |
Zenodo 20404563: RESULTS_raw.tar.zst |
CC-BY-4.0 | 2,175 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/code-agent-misalignment/v0.1.0 |
a release seal withholds [withhold] matches: a credential-shaped value printed by an agent in a tool output; value never recorded; withholding per D-336, D-609 |
authority-caps-agentdojo |
authority-caps-agentdojo · head |
agentdojo.tracelogger (v1.k14, v1.k14.incomplete) |
Zenodo 23138310 2.1.0: agent-authority-caps-v2.0.0.zip |
CC-BY-4.0 | 18,734 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/authority-caps-agentdojo/v0.1.0 |
21,999 logs; 3,260 re-packed byte copies collapse into one execution each (D-250) |
ipi-defenses-agentdojo |
ipi-defenses-agentdojo · head |
agentdojo.tracelogger (v1.k14) |
Zenodo 22011266 4.0.0: AgentSecurity-IPIDefenses-v4.0.zip |
CC-BY-4.0 | 3,211 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/ipi-defenses-agentdojo/v0.1.0 |
— |
dca-agentdojo |
dca-agentdojo · v1 |
agentdojo.tracelogger (v1.k14) |
url | MIT | 16,211 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/dca-agentdojo/v0.1.0 |
the released executions of the whole corpus, parts v1 and drift |
dca-agentdojo |
dca-agentdojo · drift |
agentdojo.tracelogger (drift.k18.conversations) |
url (the pin of part v1) |
MIT | 2,847 logs (census) | import partial, sealed corpus/dca-agentdojo/v0.1.0 |
included like every other part (D-279 addendum); 0 of 2,847 attacked runs succeed; released with the corpus, counted under dca-agentdojo · v1 |
kavach-agentdojo |
kavach-agentdojo · main |
agentdojo.tracelogger (v1.k14, v1.k14.incomplete) |
GitHub Ishani018/Kavach @ 53df9545 |
MIT | 2,619 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/kavach-agentdojo/v0.1.0 |
the released executions of the whole corpus: its three snapshots hold 2,625 distinct executions (D-253) |
kavach-agentdojo |
kavach-agentdojo · nav-fixer2 |
agentdojo.tracelogger (v1.k14, v1.k14.incomplete) |
GitHub Ishani018/Kavach @ f2dd7efa |
MIT | 1,477 logs (census) | import supported, sealed corpus/kavach-agentdojo/v0.1.0 |
released with the corpus, counted under kavach-agentdojo · main |
kavach-agentdojo |
kavach-agentdojo · rearch-forcedformat-fix |
agentdojo.tracelogger (v1.k14, v1.k14.incomplete) |
GitHub Ishani018/Kavach @ 6b31a554 |
MIT | 1,518 logs (census) | import supported, sealed corpus/kavach-agentdojo/v0.1.0 |
released with the corpus, counted under kavach-agentdojo · main |
drift1-agentdojo |
drift1-agentdojo · drift |
agentdojo.tracelogger (drift.k18.conversations) |
GitHub CGboom-git/drift-1 @ 0e28729b |
MIT | 626 (sealed) | import partial, sealed corpus/drift1-agentdojo/v0.1.0 |
— |
redcode-exec-qwencode |
redcode-exec-qwencode · qwen3coder |
qwencode.json (v0.21) |
Zenodo 23168099: trajectories_Qwen-qwen3coder.zip (+1 more pin) |
CC-BY-4.0 | 3,299 (sealed) | import supported, sealed corpus/redcode-exec-qwencode/v0.1.0 |
a release seal withholds [withhold] matches: a real-format access token in an unselected member of the deposit's supplementary archive; the archive is withheld, the value is never recorded; 4 outputs cut at 64 KiB are salvaged (D-577) |
Where each source is published, and the paper that describes it (from the profiles' [source] table; "none recorded" means none was found when the source was verified):
| Source | Name | Project | Paper |
|---|---|---|---|
agentdojo |
AgentDojo (ethz-spylab/agentdojo) native TraceLogger run logs | GitHub ethz-spylab/agentdojo |
arXiv:2406.13352 |
agentdyn |
AgentDyn (SaFo-Lab/AgentDyn) run logs | GitHub SaFo-Lab/AgentDyn |
arXiv:2602.03117 |
autodojo |
AutoDojo (xhOwenMa/AutoDojo): live capture and the ROPE-hosted attack slice | GitHub xhOwenMa/AutoDojo |
arXiv:2606.15057 |
rope |
ROPE (xhOwenMa/ROPE) defence-evaluation TraceLogger run logs | GitHub xhOwenMa/ROPE |
arXiv:2608.27496 |
adprov-v1 |
AgentDojo-PROV transcript/v1 | GitHub nickjones39/agentdojo-prov |
none recorded |
agent-security-tools-survey |
Agent Security Tools Survey | GitHub Forever-CodingNoob/agent-security-tools-survey |
none recorded |
mandate-agentdojo-eval |
Mandate-AgentDojo-Eval (jwilliamsc/mandate-agentdojo-eval) | GitHub jwilliamsc/mandate-agentdojo-eval |
none recorded |
dtap |
DTap-Bench (AI-Secure/DTap-Bench-Agent-Trajectories with AI-Secure/DecodingTrust-Agent-Platform) | HF AI-Secure/DTap-Bench-Agent-Trajectories |
arXiv:2605.04808 |
openagentsafety |
OpenAgentSafety (sani903/OpenAgentSafety): OpenHands trajectories of five models on 352 safety tasks | GitHub sani903/OpenAgentSafety |
OpenAgentSafety: A Comprehensive Framework for Evaluating Real-World AI Agent Safety (arXiv:2507.06134; found by web search) |
redcode-exec-openhands |
Which Orders Count? (Zenodo 23168099): OpenHands 1.5.0 runs on RedCode-Exec requests C1-C3 | Zenodo 23168099 | Which Orders Count? A Behavioral Study of Execution Decisions in Autonomous Coding Agents (no identifier recorded) |
foobench |
FooBench (self-authored toy format, D.12) | GitHub nickjones39/AgentPROV |
none recorded |
interbolt-agentdojo |
Interbolt on AgentDojo (deconvolute-labs/interbolt-agentdojo) | GitHub deconvolute-labs/interbolt-agentdojo |
none recorded |
melon-agentdojo |
MELON variants on AgentDojo (xwsdid/MELON) | GitHub xwsdid/MELON |
builds on MELON: Provable Defense Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks in AI Agents (arXiv:2502.05174; found by web search) |
glitch-agentdojo |
Glitch on AgentDojo (zanethomas1430-code/Glitch) | GitHub zanethomas1430-code/Glitch |
none recorded |
mohameduk-agentdojo |
UBAG gateway on AgentDojo (mohameduk/agentdojo, branch ubag-gateway-defense) | GitHub mohameduk/agentdojo |
none recorded |
tacit-agentdojo |
TACIT AgentDojo trajectories (CSSLab/Tacit) | GitHub CSSLab/Tacit |
TACIT: Detecting Harmful Agent Trajectories from Internal Representations (no identifier recorded) |
geryon-agentdojo |
Geryon (luiacuaniello/geryon) | GitHub luiacuaniello/geryon |
none recorded |
hilarytorn-trajectory-poisoning |
In-context trajectory poisoning (HilaryTorn/in-context-trajectory-poisoning) | GitHub HilaryTorn/in-context-trajectory-poisoning |
none recorded |
yockcheng-prompt-injection-harness |
Prompt injection harness (yockcheng/prompt-injection-harness) | GitHub yockcheng/prompt-injection-harness |
none recorded |
shreeyavarma-llm-safety |
llm_safety (ShreeyaVarma/llm_safety) | GitHub ShreeyaVarma/llm_safety |
none recorded |
gate-agentdojo |
gate (dafarusd/gate) | GitHub dafarusd/gate |
none recorded |
sentry-agentdojo |
SENTRY (vinhqdang/SENTRY-Anytime-Valid-E-Process-Monitoring-of-LLM-Agent-Action-Streams) | GitHub vinhqdang/SENTRY-Anytime-Valid-E-Process-Monitoring-of-LLM-Agent-Action-Streams |
none recorded |
bookkeeper-agentdojo |
Munim (sricursion/bookkeeper) | GitHub sricursion/bookkeeper |
none recorded |
aiauthz-agentdojo |
aiAuthZ on AgentDojo (Sports-Vision-Inc/aiAuthZ) | GitHub Sports-Vision-Inc/aiAuthZ |
none recorded |
kongminos-agentdojo |
jspace-agentdojo-950 (kongminOS/jspace-agentdojo-950) | GitHub kongminOS/jspace-agentdojo-950 |
none recorded |
ceferisbarov-agentdojo |
ceferisbarov/agentdojo reruns (optimised injection strings) | GitHub ceferisbarov/agentdojo |
none recorded |
memo-ozdincer-agentdojo |
memo-ozdincer/agentdojo results containers (circuit-breaker LoRRA adapters and AgentDojo defences) | GitHub memo-ozdincer/agentdojo |
none recorded |
linyxus-agentdojo |
Linyxus/agentdojo lacuna-exp (Tacit defence) | GitHub Linyxus/agentdojo |
none recorded |
craibench-agentdojo |
CrAIBench (AthaSSiN/CrAIBench) | GitHub AthaSSiN/CrAIBench |
Real AI Agents with Fake Memories: Fatal Context Manipulation Attacks on Web3 Agents (arXiv:2503.16248; found by web search) |
menelaus29-ipi-multidomain |
IPI multidomain agent study (Menelaus29/ipi-multidomain-agent-study) | GitHub Menelaus29/ipi-multidomain-agent-study |
none recorded |
llm-lock-agentdojo |
LLMLock (Wakeful-Cloud/llm-lock) | GitHub Wakeful-Cloud/llm-lock |
none recorded |
whistlebench |
WhistleBench (legobridge/whistlebench) | GitHub legobridge/whistlebench |
Why Do Language Model Agents Whistleblow? (arXiv:2511.17085; found by web search) |
seagent-agentdojo |
SEAgent artefact: AgentDojo episode logs (Zenodo 23218779) | Zenodo 23218779 | SEAgent: Securing Computer-Use Agents via Intent-Aware Static Access Control; preprint under an earlier title: Secure and Efficient Access Control Framework for Computer-Use Agents via Context Space (arXiv:2509.22256; found by web search) |
agentharm |
AgentHarm (inspect_evals agentharm, agentharm_benign) run live through the Inspect harness | GitHub UKGovernmentBEIS/inspect_evals |
arXiv:2410.09024 |
kexin-xu-01-agentharm |
Kexin-xu-01/agentharm (AgentHarm Inspect logs) | GitHub Kexin-xu-01/agentharm |
none recorded |
fragfuse-agentharm |
zixin22/fragfuse_agentharm (AgentHarm Inspect logs and memory/carrier attack runs) | GitHub zixin22/fragfuse_agentharm |
none recorded |
agentops-bench |
AgentOps-Bench v1.0 pilot (Zenodo 19875693) | Zenodo 19875693 | AgentOps-Bench: A Reproducible Benchmark for Operational Evaluation of Tool-Using LLM Agents (doi:10.5281/zenodo.19875456) |
drift |
DRIFT (SaFo-Lab/DRIFT) run logs | GitHub SaFo-Lab/DRIFT |
arXiv:2506.12104 |
credleak-p15b |
Run data of the credential-leak attack-surface measurement of LLM coding agents (Zenodo 22737462) | Zenodo 22737462 | How Credentials Leak from 'Safe' LLM Coding Agents: An Attack-Surface Measurement (no identifier recorded) |
controlarena-persistent |
Control-arena persistent-state evaluation archive (HF idacy, 2026-07-30) | HF idacy/control-arena-persistent-state-eval-archive-2026-07-30 |
Hills, Caspary & Cooper Stickland, Distributed Attacks in Persistent-State AI Control (arXiv:2607.02514) |
atia-benchmark |
ATIA: adversarial tool infiltration benchmark (mattngyn/atia_benchmark) | GitHub mattngyn/atia_benchmark |
none recorded |
autogen-guard-placement |
AutoGen guard placement (Zenodo 23025259 v1.0) | Zenodo 23025259 | Guard Placement and Interception Timing for Runtime Risk Control in AutoGen Multi-Agent Teams (doi:10.5281/zenodo.23025258) |
what-surrounds |
What surrounds an injection decides whether it works (Zenodo 21944598) | Zenodo 21944598 | What surrounds an injection decides whether it works: context and channel effects in tool-metadata attacks on seven production LLM agents (doi:10.5281/zenodo.21944597) |
mcphunt |
MCPHunt agent traces (HF lihaonan0716/mcphunt-agent-traces) | HF lihaonan0716/mcphunt-agent-traces |
MCPHunt: An Evaluation Framework for Cross-Boundary Data Propagation in Multi-Server MCP Agents (arXiv:2604.27819) |
code-agent-misalignment-geminicli |
Code-agent agentic misalignment RESULTS_raw, gemini_cli streams (Zenodo 20404563) | Zenodo 20404563 | RESULTS_raw: Raw rollout bundle for code-agent agentic misalignment benchmark (doi:10.5281/zenodo.20404563, doi:10.5281/zenodo.20404562, github.com/warmjademe/code_agent_agentic_misalignment) |
authority-caps-agentdojo |
agent-authority-caps: AgentDojo logs under enforced authority caps (Zenodo 23138310) | Zenodo 22973265 | Evaluating AI agent permission caps under prompt injection with reference scoring and enforced execution (no identifier recorded) |
ipi-defenses-agentdojo |
IPI defences replication package: AgentDojo banking logs under built-in defences (Zenodo 22011266) | Zenodo 20731176 | Evaluating Indirect Prompt-Injection Defenses in Tool-Using LLM Agents: Security, Utility, and Replication (no identifier recorded) |
dca-agentdojo |
DCA AgentDojo artefact v1: logs under DCA, CaMeL and DRIFT (Figshare 32657856) | https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.32657856 | Decision-Space Counterfactual Auditing for Prompt Injection Defense in Tool-Using LLM Agents (no identifier recorded) |
kavach-agentdojo |
Kavach: AgentDojo logs of a runtime tool-call defence (Ishani018/Kavach, three branches) | GitHub Ishani018/Kavach |
none recorded |
drift1-agentdojo |
drift-1 (CGboom-git/drift-1): DRIFT-format logs incl. a PACT-DRIFT arm | GitHub CGboom-git/drift-1 |
arXiv:2506.12104 |
redcode-exec-qwencode |
RedCode-Exec agent runs, Qwen Code part (Zenodo 23168099) | Zenodo 23168099 | Which Orders Count? A Behavioral Study of Execution Decisions in Autonomous Coding Agents (doi:10.5281/zenodo.23168099) |
8 registered parts that are not a corpus of their own
| Source · part | Role or status | Pinned origin | Executions | Caveats | |---|---|---|---|---| | `agentdojo` · `live` | live partial | GitHub [`ethz-spylab/agentdojo`](https://github.com/ethz-spylab/agentdojo) @ `a75aba76` | not in the repository: live capture produces new executions; a real-model pilot (2026-10-22, docs/reports/live-pilot/) made working corpora only, never released | — | | `agentdyn` · `d` | owned elsewhere (drift) | no pin of its own | not in the repository: 949 logs, counted under `drift` · `head` | — | | `agentdyn` · `live` | live partial | GitHub [`SaFo-Lab/AgentDyn`](https://github.com/SaFo-Lab/AgentDyn) @ `5353cf76` | not in the repository: live capture from AgentDyn's own pinned code produces new executions; a local real-model pilot (2026-10-22, docs/reports/live-pilot/) made working corpora only, never released | — | | `autodojo` · `live` | live partial | GitHub [`xhOwenMa/AutoDojo`](https://github.com/xhOwenMa/AutoDojo) @ `aa458794` | not in the repository: live capture produces new executions; a local real-model pilot (2026-10-22, docs/reports/live-pilot/) made working corpora only, never released | — | | `adprov-v1` · `converted-legacy` | compat oracle (agentdojo) | GitHub [`nickjones39/agentdojo-prov`](https://github.com/nickjones39/agentdojo-prov) @ `579a9083` `corpus/corpus-og-agentdojo-runs-prov` | not in the repository: derived data of `agentdojo` · `2024-06` (18,027 transcripts); the compat oracle, never released | licence policy `reference`: registered and censused, never released | | `foobench` · `fixture` | no status (toy format) | no pin of its own | not in the repository: a self-authored toy format with test fixtures only; no pinned snapshot | — | | `agentharm` · `live` | live partial | HF [`ai-safety-institute/AgentHarm`](https://huggingface.co/datasets/ai-safety-institute/AgentHarm) @ `e23b3fe6` | not in the repository: live runs through the Inspect harness produce new executions; a capped real-model probe (2026-10-23, docs/reports/inspect-harness/probe-d667.md) made working corpora only, never released | restricted use: AgentHarm's clause, use only to improve AI safety and security; restricted-use corpus, private (D-668) | | `drift` · `history` | import planned | GitHub [`SaFo-Lab/DRIFT`](https://github.com/SaFo-Lab/DRIFT) @ `53dbc6c5` `runs/` | [1,046](https://github.com/nickjones39/AgentPROV/blob/main/docs/reports/phase10l/census.md) logs (census) | licence policy `reference`: registered and censused, never released; committed before any licence statement (D-279) |The sealed corpora: checks and reproduction¶
Every corpus with an imported part is sealed at version 0.1.0: 52 corpora, sealed on 2026-10-29 in two batches. The
listing above gives each one's released executions and its tag (corpus/<corpus_id>/v0.1.0, whose message records
the sealed tree and its content digest); the seal reports give its root digest, what was withheld and why, and the
checks it passed.
- Round 1, eight corpora. Imported in full and rebuilt in the 2026 regeneration round (decisions
D-350..D-359), post-checked read-only
(
docs/reports/postcheck/summary.md) and sealed from8bb6bc92after their pre-release checks (docs/reports/release/pre-release-checks.md). - Wave 2, 44 corpora. The further sources, imported in full from their pins
(
docs/reports/wave-2-corpora/README.md) and sealed after their own pre-release checks (docs/reports/release/wave-2-pre-release-checks.md): 43 trees fromc0e711f4and DTap from3000b220(tagswave2/seal-c0e711f4andwave2/seal-3000b220).controlarena-persistentis a metadata-only release: its profile withholds all 5,742 executions at the seal (D-344). - Three earlier trees are never sealed.
ast-survey-agentdojo-rg1andast-survey-agentharm-rg1would ship raw files that name a third party's workstation account;adprov-v1-release-rg1lacks the compat PROV its corpus spec requires. The rg2 trees above replace them. - Security outcomes are class I in two corpora (Option A). In
mandate-agentdojo-eval(369 outcomes) and in thev1.k14logs ofagentdojo-upstream-head(11,236 outcomes), the security outcome is inferred (class I), not derived (class D): the rule that verifies AgentDojo's checker lists only the commit of the June-2024 snapshot, so logs from later AgentDojo commits cite its unverified twin (decision D-359). The checker's code is the same at those commits, so re-importing with a widened rule (Option B) was considered and set aside: the user's final choice (2026-10-28) is to keep the corpora as built and disclose the I class in their datasheets. Utility outcomes stay D. - Re-derive them at their building commit.
mainhas changed code in the stages' scope since these trees were built, so recompute or re-derive each one at the commit that built it, not atmain(chapter 4). Round 1's are5b1f6fdffor six corpora,d93aa261forast-survey-agentdojoand5fc39c16forast-survey-agentharm; their predecessors rebuilt byte for byte at their building commit (D-358,docs/reports/regeneration/d358/). Each wave-2 tree's is itswave2/build-*tag; every tree was recomputed there before the seal, and check 7 of the wave-2 seal report accounts for each after it (DTap under the re-map rule D-1002, MCPHunt with D-1001).